A discrete choice approach to model credit card fraud by Pulina, Manuela & Paba, Antonello
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A discrete choice approach to model
credit card fraud
Manuela Pulina and Antonello Paba
Sassari University, Faculty of Economics, Economics Department
(DEIR), Sassari University, Faculty of Political Science, Economics
Department (DEIS)
April 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20019/
MPRA Paper No. 20019, posted 15. January 2010 15:20 UTC
A discrete choice approach to model credit card fraud1 
 
Manuela Pulina ∗, Antonello Paba ° 
 
Abstract:  This  paper  analyses  the  demographic,  socio-economics  and  banking  specific 
determinants that influence the risk of fraud in a portfolio of credit cards. The data are from 
recent account archives for cards issued throughout Italy. A logit framework is employed that 
incorporates  cards  at  a  risk  of  fraud  as  the  dependent  variable  and a  set  of  explanatory 
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Introduction
The  current  global  recession  is  highlighting  the  fragility  of  the  global  banking  and 
finance system that is subject to greater risk and acts of fraud. There are new challenges in 
tackling fraud stemming from a fast changing information technology environment, where 
the internet has become one of the most important channels for the retail sector. Kageyama 
(2009) reports that in the past three years more than 900 companies surveyed at a worldwide 
level have lost an average of 8.2 billion dollars a year, a 22% increase with respect to the 
previously published research. Moreover, the percentage of firms that registered  at least one 
fraud in 2008 has reached 85% that is an 80% increase on the previous year. While these 
figures hide the motivation for fraud, the rates of growth are significant and in a time of 
recession this rate is more likely to increase as higher numbers of individuals commit fraud 
(Abbey, 2009).
In 2005 the worlds two largest credit card circuits, Visa and MasterCard, reported 1.14 
billion dollars of fraud losses that represented a 62.9% increase with respect to 1995. In the 
United Kingdom for example credit card fraud is one of the fastest growing crimes and in 
2008 total  card  fraud losses  amounted  to  more  than  609 million  pounds,  of  which  52.5 
million was attributed specifically to online banking fraud (Association for Payment Clearing 
Services, 2009).  Arguably,  these high amounts  can be partially be explained by the high 
volume of transactions and remarkable growth in credit cards ownership over the past three 
decades. Visa (2003) calculates a 10% year on year compound growth since cards were first 
issued. The USA for instance denotes the highest number of issued cards (more than 1.5 
billion) and each inhabitant owns on average more than 5 payment instruments. In Europe 
however, the average card holder owns 1.3 cards and the UK confirms its predominance with 
22.3% of all EU cards and 2.4 cards per capita (Assofin-Crif-Eurisko, 2008).  Such important 
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fraud losses are driving increasing efforts in both the detection and prevention of fraud and 
the implementation of robust risk management practices in the credit card industry.
In this paper credit card fraud is defined as “the misuse of a card – without authorisation 
or unapproved purchases – or the counterfeiting of cards” (Wells, 2007). The motivation and 
opportunity behind credit card fraud are many and varied. Traditional types of fraudulent 
behaviour such as identity theft relate to family members or people that can easily access 
individual’s  mail  and personal information and committing fraud either by applying for a 
card or taking over the existing account.  Dumpster diving or trashing, where criminals raid 
rubbish bins to search for credit card details  and other sensitive information is becoming 
more widespread.  Lost or stolen credit cards may also be used fraudulently.  Skimming of 
the magnetic stripe is also still practiced either using highly sophisticated devices embedded 
in ATM’s or POS or using simple hand held skimmers capable of storing magnetic stripe 
data. 
Internet enabled fraud is also growing; phishing attacks continue to harvest credit card 
users’ details and compromised computer with key loggers provide organised criminals with 
the card details.  As the vast majority of all credit card transactions are now authorised and 
cleared on-line, hacking into the e-payment chain to intercept data can harvest many millions 
of card details.  The e-fraud market has grown.  Criminals are now provided with various 
internet  resources  to  counterfeit  credit  cards,  examples  are  tipping,  custom  embossing, 
decoding machines as well as software such as Creditmaster. A common practise is also that 
of phishing where fraudulent emails hijacking brand name of banks, credit cards companies, 
(etc.) are sent aimed at acquiring trickily financial data, account usernames and passwords. 
Organised crime are normally composed by professional criminals that are setting “carding 
forums”  where  it  is  possible  to  buy  wide-scale  global  stolen  personal  and  financial 
information.   This  practise  that  leads  to  the unauthorised use of  sensitive  information  to 
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purchase goods and services often involves thousands and even millions of victims (Peretti, 
2008).  Indeed  credit  card  fraud  is  subject  to  technological  enhancement  and  it  is  in  a 
continuous evolution.
However, due the lack of statistical information on fraud - MasterCard for example is the 
only  international  circuit  that  provides  statistical  information  on  credit  card  fraud  -  few 
microeconomics studies are available in this field.  The purpose of this paper is to analyse the 
demographic, socio-economics and banking-specific determinants that influence the risk of a 
credit  card  fraud.  The  empirical  investigation  is  based  on  a  unique  dataset  containing 
approximately 320,000 observations from a recent credit card portfolio issued in Italy.  In 
2004,  MasterCard  reported  that  the  percentage  of  fraud  in  all  European  countries  was 
approximately 0.07% of card holder expenditure while in Italy this figure was 0.05% (Affari 
& Finanza, 2009). The Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS, 2009) reports 
that at a worldwide level Italy is one of the top five countries to have seen an increase in the 
use  of  fraudulent  UK credit  cards.   Fraud  on  UK-issued  cards  being  used  in  Italy  has 
increased by 72.9% since 2005, to £8.3 million in 2008.
For the portfolio of cards under study, the empirical analysis is performed on the risk of 
fraud across three product categories that are classic, gold and revolving. The econometric 
approach  is  based  on  a logit  framework,  where  the  probability  that  a  given  credit  card 
experiences a fraud is estimated.  The dichotomous dependent variable is regressed on a set 
of explanatory variables (e.g. gender, location, outstanding balance, number of transactions 
in euros and non euros). The empirical results provide useful indicators on the factors that are 
likely to influence fraud events based on the available sample. Hence, this framework offers 
not only a microeconomics perspective to analyse the risk of a fraudulent behaviour but most 
importantly an approach to help risk managers in fraud prevention by providing insight into 
which factors may lead to fraudulent events.
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The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, a literature review on credit cards 
fraud is provided. In the third section the methodology employed is highlighted. In the fourth 
section,  main empirical  results are provided and concluding remarks are given in the last 
section. 
    
A literature review in credit card fraud
Fraud  literature,  that  first  appeared  in  the  1980s,  treated  a  wide  range  of  economic 
activities  such as insurance fraud (Dionne,  1984;  Clarke,  1989; Artís,  Ayuso and Gillén, 
1999; Caudill, Ayuso and Gullén, 2005; Boyer, 2007), medical fraud (Pontell, Jesilow and 
Geis, 1982;  Feldman, 2001;  Rai, 2001) and accounting fraud ( Beasley, 1996; Gerety and 
Lehn,  1997;  Sadka,  2006;  Crutchley,  Jensen  and  Marshall,  2007).  Though  fraudulent 
behaviour has been analysed in financial markets (particularly for securities, bankruptcy and 
money laundering), very few studies exist on credit card fraud.
One of the first papers that appeared in the law and criminology literature on credit card 
fraud (Caminer,  1985)  emphasised  the  need  to  allow authorities  greater  access  to  issuer 
records and to the USA federal government to devote greater resources to the investigation of 
credit card fraud.  Hence, since the 80’s there has been the belief that credit card fraud was 
increasing  at  an  astounding  rate  and  losses  were  borne  by  customers  themselves.  It  is 
interesting to note that in Italy over 20 years after the Caminer’s appeal, all card issuers are 
obliged to report all credit card fraud into a central database (Decreto, 2007).
As  Bolton  and  Hand  (2002)  point  out,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  fraud 
prevention (that is measures to stop fraud occurring in the first place) and fraud detection 
(that is measures to identify as quickly as possible fraud once it has been perpetrated). Very 
few studies analyse how to prevent fraud occurring in the first place. Masuda (1993) for 
example reports a successful retail strategy in credit card fraud prevention. There is evidence 
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that  program  initiatives  and  an  industry-wide  action  with  the  exchange  of  fraud-related 
intelligence  data  amongst  regional  and national  authorities  seem to be the key to reduce 
credit card fraud. Williams (2007) presents a case study of credit card fraud in Tobago and 
Trinidad, new entry countries into the credit card market, in which a prevention activity can 
be improved by issuing specific  laws,  educating  and informing the public of  the various 
fraudulent  typologies  and  enhancing  the  critical  role  of  the  banking  associations  in 
formulating  ad hoc principles and policies to control this type of crime. Barker, D’Amato 
and  Sheridon  (2008)  describe  numerous  schemes  and  techniques  and  give  additional
However, detection and prevention cannot be always regarded as distinct actions. To a 
certain extent it is possible to learn from the past fraud patterns in order to prevent similar 
cases occurring in the future.  To this aim, several statistical techniques are available such as 
linear regression, classification trees, naïve Bayes, neural networks and self-organising maps 
(SOM) that builds on the clustering capabilities  of neural  networks (Thomas,  Oliver and 
Hand, 2005). These techniques are aimed at discriminating if a new credit card transaction 
belongs to the genuine set or to the fraudulent set. More recently, Quah and Sriganesh (2008) 
propose a real-time fraud detection  and present a  new approach to  analyse  card owners’ 
behaviour for detection of fraud.
In the literature, a commonly used technique to detect credit fraud is logistic regression. 
Such an econometric tool, together with the above mentioned techniques, is mostly employed 
within the credit  scoring process to help institutions  and organisations decide whether  to 
issue credit to consumers who apply for it (Desai, Crook and Overstreet, 1996; Greene, 1998; 
Thomas, 2000; Crook and Banasik, 2004).
From the present literature review, it emerges that empirical studies are mainly concentrated 
on a priori understanding of whether or not to provide consumers with a given bank product 
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(such as a credit card or loan). However, very few papers employ microeconomics bank data 
to analyse the factors that influence the risk of fraud in a portfolio of credit cards. In a recent 
study,  Hartmann-Wendels,  Mählmann  and  Versen  (2009)  make  use  of  a  sample  of 
approximately 200 thousand observations, on successful applicants from a German internet-
only bank, to analyse what factors do affect fraud. The main finding is that  fraud risk is 
highly  influenced  by  determinants  such  as  gender,  civil  status,  age,  occupation  an 
urbanisation. Above all, nationality matters as foreign customers are 22.25 times more likely 
to perpetrate a fraud than nationals.  Hence, the present paper aims at expanding this strand 
of research, providing new evidence on the main factors affecting the risk of fraud within the 
Italian  credit  card  market,  through the  analysis  of  an  extensive  credit  card  data  set  at  a 
microeconomics level. 
Methodology
Definitions and data 
The empirical model presented in this study makes use of banking microeconomics data 
on the risk of fraud occurring on three types of credit cards Classic, Gold and Revolving. A 
credit card can be defined as a payment instrument that may be employed to purchase goods 
and services and, where offered by the issuer, to borrow money on credit. Credit cards can be 
divided into their respective target segments that are mass market, premium, business and 
revolving. Mass market credit cards, sometimes referred to as “classic cards”, are well-spread 
worldwide and usually have a set of basic characteristics; a relatively limited availability to 
spend, point-of-sale (POS) and automated teller machines (ATM) functionality,  low or no 
annual  fees  and limited  add on services  as  insurance  and loyalty  programmes.  Premium 
credit cards, marketed under brands such as “gold”, “premium” and “diamond” are generally 
held by customers that are more likely to have higher incomes and spending propensity and 
7
can be thought of as a more sophisticated classic card.  Premium cards are characterised by 
higher joining and annual fees, higher spending and daily cash withdrawal limits as well as 
extra services such as travel insurance, roadside assistance, hotel and car-rental advantages. 
A minimum set of services is mandatory by the international circuit although the issuer is 
free to customise the product.  The business segment  is a vast generic segment of customers 
that includes sole traders and international corporations but, independently of company size, 
the business card must be used exclusively for business transactions as mandated in the card 
contract. 
Cards issued in the mass market, premium and business segments typically require that 
the balance be paid off in full at the end of the billing cycle. The revolving card is often 
similar to the classic card but allows the card owner to spread the payment over a series of 
billing  cycles  usually paying  interest.   Unlike the other segments,  the revolving segment 
contains customers who have a need to borrow or are happy to control the way the debt is 
repaid in exchange for an interest payment.  
In the present study gold, classic and revolving segments are analysed.   The data are 
collected from recent account archives (January 2007-December 2008) for bankcards issued 
throughout Italy.  The cards were issued on both the Visa and MasterCard circuits. Overll, 
317,231 thousand card positions are analysed.
It is important to note that this paper employs data on every individual whose application 
for  the  card  was  accepted.  Clients  with  a  poor  credit  history  are  not  accepted.  This  is 
particularly true for the revolving credit cards that are subject to stricter credit acceptance 
rules applied by the bank. Hence, in this circumstance, it is possible that the use of ex post 
selected  data  leads  to  biased  estimates  of  the  probability  to  acquire  a  given  payment 
instrument.  This issue is not uncommon in the literature as seen in other academic studies. 
For example, Hartmann-Wendels, Mählmann and Versen (2009), given the data availability, 
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make use of a sample of successful applicants from a German internet-only bank, to analyse 
which factors affect fraud. Hence, even factors that do not explicitly enter into the acceptance 
scoring process, but are at the same time correlated with the variables in the fraud equation 
may  cause  biased  predictions.  Nevertheless,  the  findings  emerging  from  actual  data  on 
successful  applications  can shed light  on understanding  potential  fraudulent  behaviour  in 
credit markets. Besides, from the bank’s perspective understanding determinants of fraud risk 
for the existing customer portfolio is important to risk managers who have to detect, control 
and prevent credit card fraud.
The dependent variable used in the binomial logit model is risk of fraud where risk of 
fraud is defined as a situation where there is risk of or actual evidence of unauthorised use of 
a credit card or its details.  These include also cards that are reported as stolen that are at risk 
of fraud.
Following the empirical study cited in the previous section, a set of explanatory variables 
are also included in the model, as follows: 
• Gender (gen) - This dichotomous variable takes the value one if female, zero if male.
• Location (loc)- These dummy variables take into account the residence of the card 
holder by macro geographical zone in Italy as defined in Table 1.
• Circuit (cr)– This dummy variable takes one as a value if the card has been issued by 
the first circuit and zero by the second circuit. 
•  Ownership or “holder” (hl)– This dummy variable takes the value one if the credit 
card has been issued for a secondary owner and zero otherwise. 
• Outstanding balance  (ob)   – The outstanding balance is the sum of all expenditure 
and charges on the card less the amounts paid.  For revolving cards this translates into what 
the customer still needs to pay off at the end of the billing cycle while for classic and gold 
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cards it is what the customer actually pays at the end of the month. Within the sample, the 
maximum value is 20,062 euros, while the minimum value is zero euros.  
• Number  of  transactions  in  euros  (nteu)  –  The  number  of  transactions  in  euros. 
Within the sample, the minimum value is zero, while the maximum value is 87 transactions.
• Number of transactions  in non-euros  (ntneu)  – The number  of transactions  in  a 
foreign currency rather than euro. Within the sample, the minimum value is zero, while the 
maximum value is 58 transactions.
• Credit line  (cl)– This is a continuous variable that accounts for the amount of the 
spending limit of the card. Within the sample, the minimum value is 1,000 euros, while the 
maximum value is 50,000 euros.
Table 2 provides a statistical description of the dichotomous variables under investigation. 
The Pearson χ2 statistics tests for the null hypothesis that the distribution of fraud case does 
not differ across the categories of the variable. Hence, the result is that all the variables are 
highly dependent with the risk of fraud.
 The model specification
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the probability that a given type of credit 
card experiences a risk of fraud.  This framework is made operational by using a particular 
distribution  for  the  disturbances,  that  is  a  logit  model  within  a  discrete  choice  structure 
(Greene,  2003).  Formally,  a  vector  of  dependent  variables  is  observed  Yi, =  (Y1,  Y2). 
Specifically, if a customer is characterised at risk of fraud (either where the customer is the 
fraudster or is a victim of fraud), and hence a given credit card is at a fraud risk, Yi takes the 
value one; likewise, if customer i belongs to the genuine set, and hence a given credit card is 
not subject to risk of fraud, then Y2 takes the value zero. Because coefficients change from 
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one regime to another,  probabilities  (P)  change leading to  a new index (I).  In analytical 
terms: 
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that  is  the  probability  of  a  fraudulent  action  is  assumed  to  be  a  function  of  customers’ 
behaviour and a set of determinants  (age, location, credit line, etc.) defined as Xi; β0 and β1 
are the parameters to be estimated; e is the logistic functional form that allows one to ensure 
that the estimated choice probabilities lie between zero and one; Λ is the cumulative logistic 
distribution function. The logistic regression is estimated using maximum likelihood.
In  discrete  choice  models,  estimated  coefficients  cannot  be  interpreted  in  terms  of 
elasticity.  Hence,  marginal  effects,  that  represent  the impact  of a  one-unit  change in  the 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable,  ceteris paribus, can be also computed.  In 
analytical terms given the index I and the probability P:
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The marginal effect (ME) for dummy variables is computed by employing the means of all 
the other variables. This gives an accurate measure of elasticity as if the dichotomy variable 
were a continuous one (Greene, 2003). Regression results are reported in the second column 
of Table 3.
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In the empirical literature, more often, the Relative Risk Ratio (RRR) is reported (see for 
example Ardiç and Yüzereroğlu, 2006).  This ratio is given by the exponential function of the 
estimated coefficient (b) and it is reported in absolute terms:
RRR = exp (b)           (10)
RRR also expresses the ratio of the probability of choosing one category over the probability 
of  choosing  the  reference  category.  In  other  words,  for  one  unit  change  in  one  of  the 
explanatory variables, it computes how many percent the relative risk of choosing a given 
category is with respect to the reference category change. Values above one indicate that 
higher  values  of  the  explanatory  variable  increase  the  predicted  probability  of  a  given 
category compared to the reference category. Coefficients less than one indicate the opposite.
 Empirical findings
The main  findings  from the  logit  regression  are  reported  in  Table  3.  With  only  one 
exception,  all  of  the coefficients  are  statistically  significant  at  the 1% level.  The overall 
statistics indicate  a well-specified model:  the likelihood ratio test  (LR(11)) show that the 
coefficients  of  the  explanatory  variables  are  jointly  statistically  significant;  the  Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (that is Pearson χ2) fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
distribution fits the data.
Considering the first dichotomous variable  gen (gender), the probability ratio indicates 
women are 1.36 times riskier than men. This outcome can be interpreted in a number of 
ways: women may be more likely to discover and report a fraudulent event than men; their 
behaviour and spending patterns puts the card at a greater risk; women may commit more 
fraud than men. As pointed out by Epaynews (2009), women are more likely to commit fraud 
in  mail  order,  communications  and loans,  whereas  men  fraudster  in  areas  such  as  asset 
finance and insurance.
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Location  turns  to  be  an  important  factor  in  explaining  risk  fraud  in  credit  cards. 
Customers who are resident in the Centre of Italy are the riskiest category in comparison to 
the reference one but also to the other geographical areas. The customers who are resident in 
the South tend to show a relative lower risk.
The second circuit is affected only 36% by fraud risk and, hence, the first circuit has 2.75 
times more probability to incur in a fraud. This finding is of a particular interest for banking 
institutions  that  should  closely  consider  banking  specific  features  such  as  the  security 
standards for a given circuit. Besides, this result may also be explained by the risk propensity 
of the pool of customers inherent to each of the circuits.    
As an additional outcome, secondary card owners are significantly more likely to be at 
risk of fraud (Table 3). In general, secondary card owners are close relatives of the primary 
owner (e.g. partners, children); these individuals may be less aware of the various fraudulent 
typologies and are more likely to be at risk. 
Overall, the coefficients of the continuous variables (ob, nteu, ntneu, cl) are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with the only exception for  ntneu. However, the effects on the 
risk of fraud is very small, as highlighted by the marginal effects results. According to the 
RRR for nteu and ntneu, the transaction in euros are slightly more risky than the non-euros 
transactions. 
 Conclusions
In the credit market literature, only a few studies make use of banking data to analyse the 
risk of fraud for a given set of credit cards (i.e. classic, gold and revolving credit cards). In 
this paper, a logit analysis has been conducted to assess which factors may lead to the risk of 
fraud. Fraud has been defined as an unauthorised use of a credit card, including card details, 
and also stolen cards that are potentially at risk of fraud. To this aim, microeconomic data 
1
have been employed for more than 300 thousand observations.  Data were obtained from 
recent account archives for bankcards issued throughout Italy.  The model has focused on 
socio-demographic as well as banking-specific factors influencing the probability to incur a 
risk of fraud.  Marginal  effects  and relative  risk ratio  have been computed.   Overall,  the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables included in the model are statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  
The  results  have  shown that  the  risk  of  fraud in  credit  cards  is  influenced  by many 
determinants:  gender,  location,  type of circuit,  card ownership, credit  line and number of 
transactions  divided  by  currency.  Women  have  been  found  to  be  riskier  than  men. 
Geographic location also matters. The Centre of Italy denotes customers that are likely to 
lead to a higher risk of fraud for the bank. Overall, the least risky geographical zone is the 
Islands.
 As a banking specific feature, transactions within the second circuit have denoted higher 
standards of security with respect to the first circuit. Furthermore, risk managers should also 
increase fraud prevention in transactions made by secondary owners who have been found to 
be 1.28 times more risky than principal owner.
Though  the  coefficients  of  the  continuous  variables  (ob,  nteu,  cl)  are  statistically 
significant, the marginal effects on fraud risk are quite small. Overall, the transaction in euros 
are  slightly  riskier  than  the  non-euro  transactions.  The  empirical  findings  show  that  an 
increase in either the credit line or in the amount the client needs to pay at the end of the 
billing cycle should not imply a higher risk. 
This paper is a novel example of consumer finance research on fraud risk. A discrete 
choice model has helped to systematically analyse the potential fraudulent behaviour  within 
the credit card market, where customers can be considered either as fraudsters or as victims. 
The empirical findings offer insightful information to risk managers on the characteristics 
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and behaviour of their pool of clients and on the potential factors that may lead to fraudulent 
actions.  Bankers  can  employ  actual  positions  to  assess  fraud  risk  and  to  discriminate 
customers into the genuine set or the at risk set. Risk managers should also closely consider 
banking specific features such as standards of security for a given circuit. 
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Table 1 Geographical zones
10000is
01000sou
00100cent
00010ne
00001nw
issoucentnenwdummy
variables
NOTE. -- Standard definitions of geographical zones are employed (ISTAT, 2009); North West (nw),
 North East (ne), Centre (cent), South (sou) that is also use as the reference category, 
Islands (is, Sardinia and Sicily). The locations of the  cardholder is given by a mapping of their postal address zip code 
 to geographical zone using tables produced by the Institute Post Office.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of dichotomous variables
Fraud 
Risk = 0 %
No Fraud 
Risk =1 % Total
Gender
Male 190,335 98.37 3,157 1.63 193,492
Female 120,962 97.76 2,777 2.24 123,739
Total 311,297 98.13 5,934 1.87 317,231
Pearson χ2= 154.328 (0.000)
Location
NW 8,522 97.61 209 2.39 8,731
NE 136,276 97.64 3,294 2.36 139,570
CEN 13,348 97.13 394 2.87 13,742
SOU 64,748 98.11 1,245 1.89 65,993
IS 88,403 99.11 792 0.89 89,195
Total 311,297 98.13 5934 1.87 317,231
Pearson χ2= 738.868 (0.000)
Cardholder
Principal 301,995 98.15 5,686 1.85 307,681
Secondary 9,302 97.40 248 2.60 9,550
Total 311,297 98.13 5,934 1.87 317,231
Pearson χ2= 28.300 (0.000)
Circuit
I circuit 204,886 97.55 5,154 2.45 210,040
II circuit 106,411 99.27 780 0.73 107,191
Total 311297 98.13 5934 1.87 317,231
Pearson χ2= 1.20E+03 (0.000)
Notes: p.value in parenthesis
1
Table 3 Logit regression results 
 Coefficients ME
Probability 
ratio
Gender (ref. male)    
gen 0.320 *** 0.00500 *** 1.36  ***
Location (ref. Islands)    
nw 0.556 *** 0.013 *** 1.87  ***
ne 0.844 *** 0.010 *** 1.74  ***
cent 0.333 *** 0.019 *** 2.28  ***
sou 0.251 *** 0.006 *** 1.39  ***
Circuit (ref. I circuit)    
cr -1.029 *** 0.014 *** 0.36  ***
Ownership (ref. 
principal)    
hl 0.251 *** 0.004 *** 1.28  ***
Outstanding balance    
ob ^ 0.0002 ***  3.52E-06 *** 1.000 *** 
Type transactions    
nteu ^ 0.0245 *** 0.0004 *** 1.025 *** 
ntneu ^ 0.0156  0.000 1.016  
Credit line    
cl ^ 0.0000413 *** 6.28E-07 *** 1.000 *** 
Number of obs. 317231  
Pseudo R2 0.0337  
LR χ2(11) 1986.33 ***  
Pearson χ2(11) 44561.75 (p-value 0.998)  
Log likelihood -28495.967      
Notes: *** indicates statistically significance at the 1%  level; 
2
